Ethereum accelerates the transaction process through a quicker block creation design. Since the time interval between the generation of blocks is very short (about 15s), block propagation time in an inefficient network is not negligible compared with the block time interval. This lead to the production of a large number of orphan blocks. In order to solve the security problems that may be caused by the orphan block and improve the transaction processing efficiency, Ethereum introduces the uncle block mechanism, i.e., an orphan block may get part of minted reward if it gets a reference by a regular block. In this paper, we show the weakness of the uncle block mechanism. Firstly, we describe the specific differences of Ethereum selfish and stubborn mining in every state from the ones in Bitcoin. Secondly, we simulate possible attacks, and the results show that the Ethereum selfish and stubborn mining strategies not only increase the reward of an attacker but also decrease the security threshold. The security threshold refers to the proportion of the attacker's computational power that needs to be achieved in order to obtain a higher reward than he should. In a practical network congestion rate, the security threshold are weakened to 0.129 and 0.216 against the Lead stubborn mining strategy and the original selfish mining strategy, respectively. When the congestion rate is rising, the reward is increasing and the threshold is decreasing. Thirdly, possible strategies are evaluated to find out the optimal one in different settings. Fourthly, we also extend the evaluation by combining three eclipse attack strategies with selfish or stubborn mining. Most of combinations bring more advantages to an attacker than a single strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The innovation of Bitcoin reveals a new milestone era for E-cash [1] , and decentralized cryptocurrencies have made a significant impact on financial systems. Nowadays, blockchain technology is being used more and more in various fields [2] .
A. ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN
Ethereum is the second generation cryptocurrency supporting smart contract coded by a Turing-complete language. Besides featuring smart contract, Ethereum also refines its proof-of-work based ancestor, Bitcoin, in several ways. Taking the structure of Ethereum block-chain as an example, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Malik Najmus Saqib . in order to accelerate processing transactions, Ethereum shortens the block interval -one of the key blockchain parameters -to about 15 seconds. However, the strength of the peer-to-peer (P2P) distributed network does not meet the requirement of high-speed information propagation. The propagation time for an Ethereum block could not be neglected compared with this 15-second block interval. Therefore, part of the computational power might be congested to a stale view. These congestion nodes create stale blocks mining on top of their outdated blockchain. Once these nodes synchronize each others' views, they would find out there are many useless blocks among the Ethereum network.
In order to keep the high block creation rate to maintain high transaction throughput, uncle block mechanism is adopted to compensate sacrificed but honest computational power by allocating part of the mint reward to these stale VOLUME 8, 2020 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ blocks (uncle blocks). Regular blocks are encouraged to reference uncle blocks to gain more block reward. In general, this tree-style Ethereum blockchain supports more transactions processing per second than a traditional chain-style data structure, e.g., Bitcoin. For Bitcoin, Nakamoto proposes the 0.51 computational power requirement to keep secure consensus. This threshold is decreased by a deviant strategy, selfish mining [3] . To waste honest computational power and obtain more dishonest reward, this strategy only reveals the private chain of an attacker at a certain time. The basic goal of the stubborn mining strategies [4] is also to give an attacker more advantage in chain competitions. An eclipse attack [5] is a networklevel attack, which tries to control all information transmitted to a victim miner.
For Ethereum, many works aim to improve the security of smart contract [6] , [7] . However, there are fewer concerns on how Bitcoin classical attacks influence the Ethereum security for different features, e.g., the uncle block mechanism. We are motivated to revisit this mechanism at the high transaction process speed. Block reward is a significant incentive for miners to behave honestly [8] . Ethereum uncle reward has attracted an attacker's attention to earn more Ethereum coins by uncle mining [9] , before Ethereum Improvement Proposal 100 (Byzantine hard fork) fixes this flaw [10] . The previous work [11] analyzes the effect of selfish mining attack towards Ethereum, but is only limited to selfish mining. We study more complicated attack methods combing stubborn mining strategies and eclipse attack, and carry out detailed simulations.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we make the following contributions.
We describe the specific differences of Ethereum selfish and stubborn mining in every state from the ones in Bitcoin. Due to the uncle block design, the reward and the number of generated blocks of an attacker, honest nodes and an eclipse victim are different from those of Bitcoin. We introduce the calculation details in our paper not only for a single selfish or stubborn mining strategy, but also for a combined eclipse attack. These details help us program a simulator to evaluate how Ethereum deals with selfish or stubborn mining, and even a combined eclipse attack.
We show that the uncle block mechanism decreases the security threshold against selfish and stubborn mining in a practical Ethereum network. Our results show that stubborn mining not only improves an attacker's reward, but also helps an attacker to earn dishonest reward more easily in Ethereum. With the increasing network congestion rates, an attacker is able to obtain more reward by selfish and stubborn mining. In Bitcoin, the classical security threshold is proved to be 0.25 proportion of the total computational power [3] to gain a higher reward. While in a practical Ethereum network, i.e., a network with 0.16 congestion rate, the Lead stubborn strategy and the selfish mining strategy decrease the security threshold of Ethereum to 0.129 (decimals are used to represent the proportion of computational power) and 0.216, respectively. The previous work [11] is only limited to selfish mining without more complex strategies.
The evaluation systematically traverses all feasible regions to find the optimal strategy under different parameters of an attacker's computational power and network congestion rate. Even there is not a strategy fitting all settings, the Lead stubborn mining strategy (L-s) and the Lead, Fork and Trail hybrid stubborn mining strategy (LFT-s) occupy a relatively large area according to our results. In addition, if the connection of a network is extremely bad, an attacker who controls a low power proportion would still win the whole reward. Compared with the work [4] , our comparison deploys network congestion rate as an independent variable instead of proportion of honest nodes mining on a dishonest chain.
The combined selfish and stubborn mining strategies are also analyzed by employing an abstract eclipse attack. By incorporating those three eclipse strategies from the previous work [4] , we make a thorough evaluation for these combined attacks in Ethereum. There are 24 combinations of possible attack strategies in total. All calculation details for the reward are different from the ones in Bitcoin. Most of the composite attacks reflect more advantages than a single selfish or stubborn mining strategy. We figure out the prominent strategies in various settings, which brings more dishonest reward than a single strategy in specific values of power proportion and congestion rate.
C. RELATED WORKS
Honest majority is a basic requirement in the first distributed secure cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, created by Nakamoto [1] . Eyal and Sirer [3] introduce a deviant strategy named selfish mining, which wastes honest power and decreases the security threshold to 0.25. The security threshold refers to the proportion of the attacker's computational power that needs to be achieved in order to obtain a higher reward than he should. Nayak et al. [4] conclude the selfish mining strategy and extend it to the stubborn mining strategies, which also combines an eclipse attack. However, all evaluations in that paper are only expressed in results without reward calculation details. Heilman et al. [5] resorted a special technique to eclipse a Bitcoin mining node, whose connections are all controlled by an eclipse attacker. Wüst and Gervais [12] and Marcus et al. [13] also mount similar attacks on Ethereum.
Bitcoin is proved to be inefficient by several works [14] - [16] , and one of the main obstacles is the P2P network performance. It cannot meet the bandwidth requirement of a blockchain. Therefore, Ethereum partly follows the concurrent transaction process and the weight of chains idea [17] - [19] , and adopts a tree-style blockchain structure to improve its efficiency.
Apart from the attention to the security of smart contract [6] , [7] , Lerner [9] finds out the uncle reward flaw due to the ignorance of uncle blocks in difficulty alteration.
The uncle mining strategy leads to the intentional raise of Ethereum coin supply, which makes each coin worth less. Ritz and Zugenmaier [11] focus on Ethereum selfish mining with the uncle block mechanism in different stale block rates. However, their evaluation only includes the naive selfish mining strategy and concerns nothing about other combined attacks.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the Ethereum uncle block mechanism and relevant attacks. Section III proposes the methodology and reasonable assumptions of our evaluation. We begin our selfish and stubborn mining evaluation on Ethereum network in Section IV and incorporate the effect of an eclipse combined attack in Section V. We discuss our analysis in Section VI and conclude in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. NOTATIONS 1) KEY PARAMETERS
We first define some key parameters used in our later analysis.
• α: the proportion of computational power controlled by an attacker;
• β: the proportion of computational power of honest nodes;
• δ: the congestion rate. Due to the inadequate network capability, δ fraction of honest nodes will mine a block having the same latest blockheight;
• β C = δβ: the proportion of computational power belonging to these congested nodes;
• β M = (1 − δ)β: the proportion of computational power of remained honest nodes;
• γ : the fraction of honest power mines on top of a dishonest chain, as denoted in the previous works [3] , [4] , [11] ;
• λ: a victim's fraction of computational power. In Section IV, λ = 0 since we do not consider the eclipse attack. While in Section V, λ > 0.
2) THE REWARD OF AN ATTACKER
The mining difficulty alteration in Ethereum depends on both regular blocks and uncle blocks. During the evaluation, we use the following notations to denote their corresponding meanings:
• attBlocks, honBlocks, vicBlocks: the number of blocks owned by an attacker, honest nodes and a victim, respectively;
• attGains: the temporary reward;
• R = attGains/(attBlocks+honBlocks+vicBlocks): the reward proportion of an attacker. Note that in Section IV, vicBlocks equals to 0;
• R SM/SBM (x): the attacker's reward proportion who deploys a selfish or stubborn mining strategy where x denote the attacker's proportion of computational power.
3) THE FORM OF THE NUMERAL
Besides showing the absolute value of an attacker's reward and a security threshold, we also use the rate of change value for making the comparison more clearly. To avoid ambiguity, we only express rate of change in the format of percentage, and all other proportions and ratios are in decimals.
4) THE MEANINGS OF DIFFERENT SHAPES
In the figures of our cases analysis, different shapes have special meanings as follows:
• A full line reference: a regular block pointer; • A dotted line reference: an uncle block pointer; • A full line rectangle: a block that has been revealed to the network;
• A dotted line rectangle: a private block withholding by an attacker;
• The letter in a rectangle: the owner type of a block. A, H, C and V denote an attacker, honest nodes, congestion nodes and a victim, respectively.
B. STATE MACHINE
The state machine is an abbreviation of the finite state machine, which is a mathematical model abstracted from the operational rules of real things [20] . A finite state machine is a tool used to model object behavior. Its role is to describe the sequence of states that an object experiences during its life cycle and responses to various external events.
The state machine has four elements. The first is State which refers to the current state. A state machine must contain at least two states. The second is Event. An event is more like a condition. When a condition is met, an action is triggered. The third is Action which is performed after a condition is satisfied. After the action is executed, the state machine can move to a new state or remain in the original state. Actions are not necessary. When the conditions are met, it could move directly to the new state without performing any actions. The fourth is Transition. That is, changing from one state to another [21] .
In our paper, state machines are used to analyze selfish and stubborn mining strategies. In order to study how much additional benefit each attack strategy could bring to the adversary, we need to know the proportion of the block generated by the adversary in the total block when the steady state is reached under each attack strategy. Using the state machine, after determining various parameters such as the attacker's computational power, network congestion rate, etc., we could compute the occurrence probability of each state, and then calculate the proportion of the attacker's block in the steady state. Comparing this ratio with the attacker's actual computational power, we could know the specific benefits of the attack strategy.
C. ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN
Ethereum consists of four phases, Frontier, Homestead, Metropolis, and Serenity. In the first three phases, the same proof-of-work mechanism as in Bitcoin in used to achieve distributed consensus. While proof-of-stake mechanism will be adopted in the last phase [22] , [23] . To accelerate transactions processing, Ethereum decreases the interval between two blocks. However, it is impossible that every block is included as a single blockchain in an inefficient network. Ethereum awards a miner if his block is one-descendant from the main chain and is referenced by a regular block. This block is called an uncle block. The referenced relationship creates extra mint reward, 1/32 proportion of block reward for the regular block owner and (8 − i)/8 for the uncle one. The variable i ranges from 1 to 6 according to how many blockheight the reference occurs after the uncle block creation. Moreover, a regular block could reference up to two uncle blocks.
Besides refining the structure of blockchain, Ethereum has another two security improvements. One is the random tie breaking rule. Instead of accepting the firstly received chain, a node randomly selects one chain within all received chains of the same length. The number γ is not fixed anymore and equals the inverse of the competing chains number. The other one aims to remit the uncle mining strategy [9] . Uncle mining infringes honest miners' interests indirectly by inflating the supply of Ethereum coins, which is fixed in EIP 100 [10] by counting all regular and uncle blocks in difficulty alteration.
D. SELFISH AND STUBBORN MINING
After Nakamoto introduces the requirement of an honest majority [1] , Bitcoin is known to securely achieve a decentralized consensus. However, Eyal and Sirer [3] break this threshold by introducing a deviant strategy, selfish mining (SM). When and how to reveal a private block has a marked impact on the reward of an attacker. The key idea is to waste honest computational power as much as possible, on the chain which will be abandoned eventually. Their results show that Bitcoin only survives at 0.25 dishonest power proportion in the random tie breaking rule.
Nayak et al. [4] offer an attacker more advantages by stubborn mining (SBM) strategies. The key idea is that an attacker could create more competitions to waste more honest power. Nayak et al. propose three basic strategies and their combinations. The Equal Fork stubborn strategy (F-stubborn, F-s) means an attacker does not hurry to reveal the latest attacking block if he wins a tie breaking. The attacking block is revealed after honest nodes extend the honest chain or the attacking chain. The Trail stubborn strategy (T-stubborn, T-s) is set in the situation where an attacker does not give up too early when his private chain is one block behind the main chain. The attacker still could surpass from behind with some possibility. The Lead stubborn strategy (L-stubborn, L-s) requires an attacker to never cover an honest chain by two leading blocks. Instead, the attacker always reveals only one block to launch a chain competition when he is leading. FT-stubborn (FT-s), LF-stubborn (LF-s), LT-stubborn (LT-s) and LFT-stubborn (LFT-s) are hybrid strategies based on the naive ones.
E. ECLIPSE ATTACK
Besides introducing the seven stubborn strategies, Nayak et al. [4] also combine an abstract eclipse attack on Bitcoin. In this abstract attack, the implementation details of an eclipse attack are omitted, e.g., controlling all incoming and outgoing connections of a node [5] . In their model, the network is divided into three partitions, i.e., an attacker's part, a victim and an honest one. Although some measures could achieve intrusion detection [24] , eclipse attacks could still be exploited by attackers.
For selfish and stubborn mining combination, Nayak et al. [4] come up with three eclipse strategies.
1) DESTROY (DES.) STRATEGY
The attacker blocks all input and output information of a victim. As a result, the computational power of the victim is wasted and the total effective power equals to 1 − λ. Let R Des (α, λ) denote the attacker's reward proportion under this strategy. Recall that R SM/SBM (x) represents the attacker's reward proportion under a selfish or stubborn mining strategy.
The attacker manipulates the communication channel, e.g., a firewall, to open and close according to its own interests, which actually creates a collusion between an attacker and a victim. In this case, the total mining power proportion is α + λ. As a conclusion, the rewards of collude eclipse attack with selfish and stubborn mining are R Col (α, λ) = α α+λ · R SM/SBM (α + λ).
3) DESTROY IF NO STAKE (DNS) STRATEGY
A conditional combination of the Des. and Col. strategy where an attacker recognizes a victim's block only if this block is mined on top of the attacking chain. If a victim's work is accepted by honest nodes, the attacker also gets his stake. Under this strategy, the reward of the attacker is complicated to be denoted by an equation directly. Four zones are designed [4] to describe various view situations.
• Zone 1: Honest nodes, the victim and the attacker mine on an identical chain.
• Zone 2: The victim mines on an individual chain. While honest nodes and the attacker mine on another chain. This view is the same as the Des. strategy.
• Zone 3: Honest nodes mine on a chain. The attacker and the victim mine on another chain and share views with each other. This is similar to the Col. strategy.
• Zone 4: Honest nodes, the victim and the attacker mine on three different chains, respectively.
III. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTION
In a PoW-based cryptocurrency, the mining process could be seen as a Markov process. Eyal and Sirer [3] model this process between an attacker and an honest pool in a twoparty scenario. Apart from their analytic solving method, Nayak et al. [4] introduce a numeric method which is suitable for more possible cases. When an attacker tries to compete with honest nodes by revealing his mining blocks one for a time, it is not easy to calculate the reward of an attacker in equations. This is the reason that this paper follows a numeric method and adapts it to Ethereum. The calculations have many differences from Bitcoin for an attacker's reward and the block number contribution. Even this numeric method could simulate the mining process, some assumptions are still necessary for simplification as follows.
1) The attacker is well connected to the whole network. Hence, he can access to total blocks including the main chain and other forking blocks. Part of honest nodes have a stale view, which is one block behind the latest blockheight. Hence, congestion nodes create a fork which has the same blockheight as the current latest honest block. 2) The Ethereum network is eventually synchronized for an epoch. The natural network delay could create the latency time up to one block interval. It means that congestion nodes update their views after a new block is revealed to the public network. 3) When an attacking block loses in a competition, it is instantly referenced by honest nodes due to their perfect connection. There are at most twelve one-descendant blocks which are not referenced at a specific time point. Note that an honest block would not be referenced by an attacker. This uncle block selection preference further amplifies the dishonest reward. The Practical Network Congestion Rate. The ratio of uncle blocks is relied on estimating the number of congested nodes. In 2018, there are 402,000 uncle blocks and 2,155,929 regular blocks being included in the Ethereum blockchain [25] , which infers a typical value of δ as about 0.16 throughout this paper.
IV. SELFISH AND STUBBORN MINING IN ETHEREUM
In this section, we describe how selfish and stubborn mining help an attacker to obtain more reward in Ethereum. Eyal and Sirer [3] and Nayak et al. [4] only focus on Bitcoin. In addition, Nayak et al. [4] just introduce their stubborn strategies in evaluation results but omit the reward calculation details for every case, which is actually the most significant part for future researches to discourage selfish and stubborn mining. The analysis of Ethereum selfish mining in [11] does not include calculation details and is limited to the original strategy without complex combined attacks.
A. STRATEGY ANALYSIS
In the Markov model of mining blocks, the reward is calculated upon the transition of a state. The state number means the leading difference between a private chain and a public chain. The Ethereum Markov state machine is similar as that of Bitcoin [3] , [4] . The actual mining power of honest nodes is decreased to β M as shown in Fig. 1 . We consider both the random tie breaking policy and the effect of the congestion part of network. The value of γ is not fixed in the simulation program, which is the inverse of the same blockheight fork number.
State 0 (Fig. 2) : When an attacker finds a valid block, he holds it, without revealing and the state transits to 1. If honest nodes mine a block, they obtain the reward and the attacker updates his view. Congestion nodes only mine blocks with the same current blockheight as honest nodes. We need a variable to temporarily record the fork number. An array is also used to store the expected number of a congestion block, which is β M due to the attacker's preference.
State 1 (Fig. 3) : If an attacker mines a block after his dishonest block, the difference is increased. When honest nodes find a block, the attacker reveals its block instantly and the state enters into state 0 . Congestion nodes also create a fork based on their stale view.
State 0 in SM and L-s strategies (Fig. 4) : This is a competition state (a tie) that an attacker and other honest nodes try to break. Part of honest mining power mines on the top of an attacking chain ( Fig. 4(b) ). There are three transition paths to state 0 in SM and L-s strategies. Ethereum has deployed the random tie breaking policy. Even the attacking power sticks to its chain, other nodes select a main chain in an average possibility. A lost honest block would only be referenced by an honest block in the future due to the selection preference. While a lost dishonest block must be referenced instantly for the reference preference of an attacker. Our simulator counts the number of unreferenced blocks and makes sure that every referenced block is one-descendant from the main chain.
State 0 in F, T, FT, LF, LT and LFT-s strategies ( Fig 5) : Additionally, stubborn mining strategies show different choices of an attacker. If an attacker wins a tie, he holds the latest block without revealing it in F-s, FT-s, LF-s and LFT-s strategies, in order to wait honest nodes to mine a block. He does not give up in T-s, TF-s, LT-s and LFT-s strategies, and continues to mine on his private chain even this chain is one block behind the main chain. Note that the latest honest block has no reference to the attacking block. The reason is that if the attacker surpasses, the uncle block reference becomes invalid. We calculate this case until a certain state in the future.
State −1 (Fig. 6) : If an attacker is fall behind while catches up again in state −1, the state transits to state 0 . If honest nodes mine another valid block, an attacker fails and updates his view. In this case congestion nodes create a block with the same latest honest blockheight, which is one less than an attacking chain.
State 0 (Fig. 7) : This state is similar to state 0 . However, an attacking block is instantly revealed after honest nodes find a block in state 1 → 0 . There still exists a probability that part of honest power mines on top of a dishonest chain. While in state −1 → 0 , the time of an attacking block creation is late for the current latest honest block. All honest power sticks to the public chain, and only dishonest power mines on the private fork. For FT-s and LFT-s strategies, the attacker still holds the newest block if he wins in a state 0 tie. State 2 in SM, F-s, T-s, FT-s strategies (Fig. 8) : If honest nodes find a block when an attacker holds a two-block private chain, the attacker reveals them at a time to cover an honest block because honest nodes obey the longest chain rule.
State k, k > 2 in SM, F-s, T-s, FT-s strategies (Fig. 9) : If honest nodes find a block when an attacker holds a private chain which is more than two blocks than an honest chain, the attacker definitely obtains the reward of this block.
State k, k ≥ 1 in L-s, LF-s, LT-s, LFT-s strategies (Fig. 10) : In these strategies, if honest nodes find a block when an attacker holds a private chain which is longer than an honest chain, the attacker always reveals only one block to enter a competition state, i.e., (k − 1) . (Fig. 11) : State k , k ≥ 1 is also similar to state 0 . If an attacker mines a block, the leading is increasing to (k + 1) . Some honest miners will mine on top of an attacking chain. There are two transition paths from state k to state (k − 1) . One is to mine the next honest block behind an honest chain, the other follows the chain of the attacker.
State k , k ≥ 1 in L-s, LF-s, LT-s, LFT-s strategies

B. SIMULATION RESULT 1) METHODOLOGY
According to the strategies in Section IV-A, we design a simulator to evaluate how these eight strategies (the original selfish mining strategy and the seven stubborn mining ones) assist an attacker in his reward. For different strategies and each choice of α, δ, 100 sample paths of each state machine are simulated. For each path, a large number of iterations are carried out to reach a stable state. After that, the revenue of the attacker and honest nodes could be calculated. The value of γ is not fixed, which is the inverse of the same blockheight fork number.
2) ABSOLUTE REWARDS
For Ethereum selfish and stubborn mining, how much an attacker obtains is compared in Table 1 in some typical values. Besides selfish mining in Ethereum, the attacker's rewards of other seven stubborn strategies also increase with congestion rate. From these results, the L-stubborn strategy is the best one if α = 0.20, δ = 0.16. The LF-stubborn strategy is the optimal one if α = 0.25, δ = 0.16 and the LFT-stubborn strategy ranks the first if α = 0.3, δ = 0.3. An attacker who controls 0.3 power proportion could even multiple the reward more then twice if the network has 0.3 congestion rate. When the congestion rate is quite large, a very small attacker could obtain all mining reward of the whole system. The reason is that the main honest power is smaller than the attacking power in a large congestion rate. The optimal strategies in all settings are shown in Fig. 12 . Most areas are occupied by L-s and LFT-s strategies.
3) THE SECURITY THRESHOLD
The security threshold against selfish and stubborn mining matters much more than the absolute reward calculation in the evaluation, which could assist researchers to alarm the cryptocurrency community if a big mining pool develops. In the 2018 Ethereum network congestion setting (δ = 0.16), the threshold against selfish mining decreases by 13.6% to α = 0.216. An attacker controlling more than 0.216 power proportion is able to gain more reward than he deserves by the original selfish mining strategy. As shown in Table 2 , for other seven stubborn mining strategies, adding congestion rate also decreases the security threshold. Considering the difficulty to break the threshold, the L-s strategy is the most destructive. It decreases the threshold by 48.4% to α = 0.129 in 0.16 Ethereum congestion rate, and decreases by 55.2% to α = 0.112 in δ = 0.3. 
V. SELFISH AND STUBBORN MINING WITH AN ECLIPSE ATTACK
We follow the idea of Nayak et al. [4] to analyze how many advantages an extra eclipse attack offers. This combined attack includes an abstract eclipse attack with selfish and stubborn mining. For this abstract method, this analysis omits specific eclipse attack techniques, e.g., [12] , [13] , and models the power proportion of a victim λ, to reflect the level of an eclipse attack. An eclipse attacker controls a firewall between a victim and honest nodes, which filters the passing information.
Following [4] , the eclipse attack strategies include Destroy (Des.), Collude (Col.) and Destroy if No stake (DNS). The reward equations of the first two naive strategies are concluded in Section II-E. We focus on the calculation details of a DNS strategy eclipse attack in this section.
An Extra Assumption for an Eclipse Attack in Ethereum. Actually, a compact cluster of nodes are more likely to be blocked by an eclipse attacker than a group of distributed nodes. Therefore, we assume that a potential victim is compact in topology. There will be no congestion block created by a victim.
A. THE DNS ECLIPSE ATTACK STRATEGY IN ETHEREUM
Whether an attacker blocks the chain from a victim in the DNS strategy is decided by its contribution to this chain. It could be seen as a probabilistic destroy or collude strategy [4] . However, the previous work [4] did not describe transitions details, which are different from Ethereum. We next explain the reward calculation details under the impact of congestion nodes. The reward of an Ethereum attacker is attGains/(attBlocks + vicBlocks + honBlocks). The mining process is divided into four zones according to the three parties' mining views. There is no need to calculate the reward of other two parties.
1) THE THREE PARTIES MINE ON TOP OF AN IDENTICAL CHAIN
In zone 1, as shown in Fig. 13 , all nodes mine on the same chain, which means that neither a victim nor an attacker finds a valid block. If a victim finds a block, an attacker does not propagate this block to honest nodes. The system enters into zone 2. If an attacker mines a valid block, he shares it with a victim without honest nodes, in order to withhold a private chain with a victim. The transition targets to zone 3. Besides the zone variable, there are two other variables reflecting the length difference between a victim or an attacking chain and an honest chain, i.e., stateV or stateA, respectively. Another array in our simulator records the private chain of an attacker, which could include a victim's block.
2) A VICTIM MINES ON TOP OF A DIFFERENT CHAIN FROM OTHERS
An attacker and honest nodes share an identical view in zone 2 (stateA = 0), which is independent with the victim view. Transitions for this zone depend on the leading difference of a victim chain, i.e., the variable stateV.
1) A victim competes with an attacker and honest nodes, stateV = 0 ( Fig. 14) . In this kind of a tie, the victim does not access the attacker's view. The victim sticks to his own chain in competition. If the victim wins, the isolation with his leading keeps existing. If the attacker wins, the attacker shows the latest block to cover a victim chain. The victim honestly obeys the longest rule, which leads to a collusion (zone 3). The expected number of the victim's uncle blocks vicBlocks counts his own power proportion λ for a future reference. If honest nodes wins, the attacker and the victim follow them and the mining process backs to zone 1. Note that a victim's block will not be propagated to honest nodes in this zone. 2) A victim chain leads the chain of an attacker and honest nodes, stateV > 0 ( Fig. 15 ). If a victim obtains a leading position, his next block expands this superiority. However, this superiority is isolated by an eclipsed firewall, which does not influence the view of honest nodes. Hence, an attacking block creation pushes the system into zone 4, where every party holds different mining views. An attacker would accept an honest block in this case.
3) HONEST NODES MINE ON TOP OF A DIFFERENT CHAIN FROM OTHERS
The transitions in zone 3 are quite similar to single selfish and stubborn mining (stateV = 0). Due to the space limitation, we take stateA = 0 as an example. stateA = 0 in zone 3 means state 0 in Section IV. The selfish or stubborn mining strategy decides whether an attacker reveals the latest block and whether he gives up, as shown in Fig. 16 . For SM and L-s strategies, if honest nodes win, a private chain only obtains at most one uncle block reward according to who is the first block owner.
For F, FT, LF and LFT-s strategies, a latest attacking block or victim's block is hidden, as shown in Fig. 17 . If the colluded group loses in a tie, an attacker does not give up for one block fall behind in T, FT, LT and LFT-s strategies.
Other cases. All transitions in cases including stateA=1, stateA=2, stateA>2, stateA=k (k ≥ 1), stateA=−1 and stateA=0 in zone 3, and zone 4 (three parties mine on top of individual chains), are easily to be extended from the descriptions in Section IV. They are provided in the full paper.
B. SIMULATION RESULT
For the overview of these combined attacks, there are 24 combinations in total. The best combination of an eclipse attack strategy and a selfish or stubborn mining strategy in different power proportion settings is shown in Fig. 18 in typical network congestion rates (δ = 0, 0.16, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8). We also consider the non-trivial requirement that the total power proportion of an attacker and a victim is below a half. Eclipse means a Destroy eclipse strategy combining honest mining. The best combined strategy gives an attacker more than a single selfish or stubborn mining strategy.
The results of a typical attacker who controls 0.25 power proportion in different congestion rates are also shown in Table 3 . This attacker could obtain at most 96.4% extra reward more than honest mining by eclipsing a λ = 0.1 victim in the Col.+LFT-s eclipse strategy. Compared with the single LFT-s strategy, this reward also increases by 56.9%. For most combinations, these results are larger than the ones by a single selfish or stubborn mining strategy ( Table 1) . The exception includes a DNS eclipse attack combined with the Lead stubborn family strategy, i.e., DNS+L-s, DNS+LF-s, DNS+LT-s and DNS+LFT-s. These four combinations only help an attacker earn more than honest mining.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. AN ARGUMENT FOR INTRODUCING NETWORK CONGESTION RATE IN AN ETHEREUM EVALUATION
In this paper, the whole analysis always concerns the effect of network congestion rate δ. In the previous work [4] , the proportion of honest computational power mining in a private chain γ is used to offer more advantages to an attacker. However, the authors of [3] , [4] have recognized that γ also reflects the network control strength by an attacker. λ, the power of an eclipsed victim, and γ are two subject indicators for the attacker's network control level. The attacker could be able to balance λ and γ instead of selecting an optimal stubborn mining strategy. In this paper, due to the fact that Ethereum has deployed the random tie breaking rule, δ is a more objective indicator. Hence, our evaluation is of more practical value because an attacker could only figure out the best strategy in a given network congestion rate. Our researchers also may design specific detecting and resisting techniques pointing to different parameters.
B. THE DIFFERENCES OF THIS ETHEREUM EVALUATION FROM THE BITCOIN ONE
For calculation, the reward and the block number calculation in various cases are different from the ones in Bitcoin. For results, the largest Bitcoin mining pool, BTC.com, accounts for 0.1435 power proportion, which has been worried about for the 0.25 security threshold. In Bitcoin, every selfish or stubborn mining strategy is not able to decrease the security threshold with adding the attacker's reward. However, in this Ethereum work, the L-stubborn strategy decreases the threshold to 0.129 in a practical network congestion rate 0.16. The largest Ethereum mining pool, Ethermine, has controlled 0.27 power proportion in early 2019 [25] , which is above the L-stubborn security threshold.
For comparing different strategy combinations, our work deploys network congestion rate δ instead of γ in [4] as an independent variable. Our evaluation also shows different results. In Bitcoin, LF-stubborn strategy occupies a large region (Figure 7 in [4] ), in which the value of γ is relatively large. Single L-s or F-s never becomes an optimal choice. However, the Ethereum L-stubborn strategy fits the most regions as shown in Fig. 12 . For the eclipse combined evaluation, Bitcoin DNS+LT takes up the largest region in γ = 0.5 (Figure 13 (c) in [4] ). The Ethereum result in Fig. 18 shows that Col.+LFT strategy is the one occupying the most regions in δ = 0.16. As network congestion rate rises, Ethereum Des.+LFT gradually becomes the one occupying the most regions. 
1) THE ACCURACY ERROR OF ETHEREUM NETWORK CONGESTION RATE ESTIMATION
The definition of network congestion rate is the proportion of honest nodes holding a stale view. For a rough estimating method, the ratio of uncle blocks is calculated from Jan. 2018 to Dec, 2018 from the data in [25] . It gets its max value in Jan. 2018 as 0.22 and minimum in Dec. 2018 as 0.08. The average value 0.16 is the typical value for the selfish and stubborn mining evaluation in Section IV and the extra combined eclipse attacks evaluation in Section V. For the definition, network congestion rate ranges from 0 to 1. However, this rough estimation method limits the range to [0, 2 3 ], because a regular block only references up to two uncle blocks. Note that even though this is the error source of this whole evaluation, the measurement of the δ value is orthogonal to this paper.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This work systematically evaluates how the uncle block mechanism decreases the security of Ethereum. We show that this mechanism not only adds the reward of selfish and stubborn mining, but also decreases the security thresholds. This effect further increases with the rising of the network congestion rate. In a practical network setting, the security thresholds decrease to 0.129 and 0.216 for the Lead stubborn strategy and the naive selfish strategy respectively. Additionally, the dishonest reward is further raised by deploying an abstract eclipse attack. From our analysis results, Ethereum researchers should be alarmed not to ignore the basic security problem of the proof-of-work consensus with functional improvements. We will do further research on other altcoins to see whether their special structures incur different security problems.
